Iconic violence: belief, law and the visual by Kayman, Martin A.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/95507/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Kayman, Martin A. 2018. Iconic violence: belief, law and the visual. Textual Practice 32 (1) , pp.
139-161. 10.1080/0950236X.2016.1249710 file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0950236X.2016.1249710
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0950236X.2016.1249710>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
 Iconic Violence: belief, law and the visual 
 
Martin A. Kayman 
Cardiff University 
 
 
  
 ii 
ABSTRACT 
In early 2015, the attacks provoked by cartoons of the Prophet and the execution videos 
released by Islamic State staged a bloody encounter between two aesthetics of the image 
and two visions of its law. The confrontation between caricature and documentary realism 
and between blasphemy and freedom of expression form the context for this inquiry into the 
violence associated with beliefs about images. Violence can arise not only as a result of 
religious beliefs but equally from the contribution of visual evidence to secular convictions. 
The article shows how recent reassessments of the ethics of ‘law and the visual’ draw on the 
emancipatory discourses of the ‘pictorial turn’ and its recourse to the discourse of the early 
iconoclastic debates. The key legacy of the Byzantine debates, I argue, is less a theory of 
the image as the polemical identification of the iconoclast and the idolater and the 
management of the violent passions they evoke for each other. What is ultimately at issue in 
laws governing relations between seeing and believing are the attitudes people have to 
those who do not share their regime of the visual, and which, at times of crisis, can revive 
passions associated with veneration and execration. 
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Iconic Violence: belief, law and the visual  
‘Can Images Kill?’ asked the theorist of the Byzantine icon, José-Marie Mondzain in the 
wake of the attack on the World Trade Centre on 9 September 2001.1 The previous year, 
pictures of the commemorations of the Millennium on television screens around the world 
had enabled an ‘international sharing of emotion’ over what Mondzain describes as a 
celebration of the ‘reign … of the image … the undisputed domination of the visible and of 
visual industries in full legitimacy.’2 In contrast, in 2001, she continues, ‘in massacring so 
many people and in destroying the towers, the enemy gave us the first historical spectacle of 
the death of the image in the image of death.’ While pictures of death and destruction 
perpetrated by many ‘enemies’ of one another have continued to disgrace television 
screens, two particular atrocities came together in early 2015 in another horrific chiasmus of 
the image and deathly violence with the character of a global confrontation. In January and 
February of that year, supporters of the self-styled Islamic State (ISIS) attacked the offices of 
the French satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, as well as Jewish and other targets in Paris 
and Copenhagen. In the meantime, at the end of January, ISIS released the last of a 
sequence of videos which they had begun to publish on the internet the previous August 
depicting the beheading of Western civilians.3  
The attention given in the press and social media to the targeting of French and 
Danish cartoonists, along with reactions to ISIS’s videos, can be seen as staging a bloody 
confrontation between two aesthetics of the image as well as two visions of its law. In this 
confrontation, the art of caricature, accused by Islamic fundamentalists of perpetrating 
blasphemy, was turned for the West into a global image of the right to freedom of 
expression. At the same time, in contrast to the line drawings of the cartoonists, the 
documentary style of ISIS’s Al Hayat Media Center’s videos was seen as contravening the 
limits of what should be seen or shown as they became, to anyone other than those who 
shared their beliefs, a global image of the inhuman defiance of all legality.4 Caricature vs 
realism; blasphemy vs freedom of expression; what may, or should, (not) be displayed to 
sight. These confrontations form the context for this essay’s inquiry into the relationship 
today between images and belief and the violence that can result – be the image, or the 
related violence, deemed criminal, or an instrument of the ‘force of law’ itself. The outrages 
can be read as resulting from the relationship between what people believe and what, in 
accord with those beliefs, their law permits to be seen or shown, and what it mandates as a 
consequence of transgression. I am not confining ‘belief’ to religious faith here. Secular law 
manifests a complementary relationship between seeing and believing in the reverse 
direction: what one is expected or permitted to believe in relation to what one is shown. The 
language of evidence and the rules governing it testify to the force of seeing, the power of 
the eye as witness. The connection to ‘the field of pain and death’5 is not always as obvious 
as in our examples, nor as brutal – and yet belief in what one is shown can play a decisive 
role in convictions, even, in some jurisdictions, executions. In sum, the role of belief in 
determining the norms governing what one is permitted to see or to show is complemented 
by the norms by which people are convinced, and others convicted, by images and the 
beliefs they compel.  
In modern times, the power of images to instil belief in the truth of what they appear 
to depict has meant that the visual has traditionally been regarded with caution, particularly 
in the context of law. In contrast, over the past two decades, a progressive shift from ‘law 
and literature’ to ‘law and the visual’ has accompanied an increasing emancipation of the 
visual.6 Interventions like Martin Jay’s ‘Must Justice be Blind?’ have sought to liberate the 
image from its traditional association with the idolatrous seductions of the sensual and its 
consequent subjugation to the reason of law conceived as sola scripta.7 Such revaluations 
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take their place within the larger critique of the phallogocentric which has characterised 
much progressive work in the humanities over the last half-century. Yet the increasing use in 
court of video evidence and digitally-generated re-enactments and representations of 
scientific evidence have resurrected anxieties about what we believe about what is 
presented to our sight. In response to these technologies, figures like Richard K. Sherwin 
have sought new grounds, specific to visual experience, on which to judge the relationship 
between what we see or are shown, and what we come to believe, be it in a particular case, 
or in relation to the law in general.8 As law and literature drew largely on the tendencies of 
literary theory from the 1970s to treat all cultural phenomena as linguistic constructs, law and 
the visual puts into play theories of the image from the 1990s that have sought emancipation 
from the linguistic model. 
I will seek here to draw together the two configurations of seeing and believing and 
believing and seeing: one seeking reliable grounds for conviction by images in order to 
enforce the law with justice; the other acting violently in the name of the justice of its 
convictions about the law of images. Reading the first in the context of the rise of visual 
studies, I shall argue that the association of violence with images is not the consequence 
exclusively of the beliefs of religious fundamentalists. The normative beliefs that we find in 
modern discourses regarding images are also capable of carrying destructive passions. 
These passions can be understood in terms of the survival of what I shall call a ‘religious 
remainder’ in emancipatory discourses on the image, and, thereby, of the potential violence 
of our secular zeal for the dominant regimes of the visual. In order to make this case, I shall 
first place the shift from law and literature to law and the visual in a broader disciplinary 
history that links it to the question of religion. My account of the turn-of-the-century rise of 
visual studies will develop these links by taking us back to the legitimation of images in the 
iconoclastic debates of the Byzantine Empire. Here, besides the iconodule or iconophile, we 
will find the polemical figures who connect the turn to the visual, the law of images, and 
religious violence: the iconoclast and the enemy on whose existence his own is predicated, 
the idolater. In the final section, these figures will help us understand what is at stake for the 
relation between belief and the visual in the aesthetics, and the violence, of the video and 
the caricature with which we began.  
The textual and the pictorial turn 
Let us turn then to a brief narrative of law’s disciplinary conjunctions, to trace the passage 
from literature to the visual and its relation to religion. The law and literature movement 
opened up the law to its others as part of the ‘linguistic’ or ‘textual turn’ of the late twentieth 
century. Reading law as literature subverted the confident singularity of law’s truths, and 
promoted the claims of alternative sources, experiences and visions of justice to those the 
law had traditionally protected. For its part, Western law has sought, with some success, to 
accommodate diverse narratives of gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity and religious belief 
largely through the jurisprudence of human rights. Of the various tensions that have arisen 
between rights, those grounded in differing religious belief have arguably most tested the 
limits of law’s capacity to negotiate a plurality of nomoi – in the case of the UK, mainly in 
relation to the jurisdictions of Christian dogma and of Sharia over gender, sexuality and 
freedom of expression.  
 Besides putting the boundaries of competing human rights under pressure, the 
assertion of religious claims has challenged the constructivism and cultural relativism 
associated with the linguistic turn. In this, it has been joined by two other demands that 
emerged in the last decade of the twentieth century in the name of a justice founded on 
something more substantial than the alleged abstract formalism of textual criticism. On the 
one hand, as Costas Douzinas observes, the mainstream turn to formal human rights also 
‘marked a global “ethical turn”’, in which critical lawyers sought to speak for a justice founded 
on a commitment to the irreducible and substantive singularity of the Other.9 During the 
nineties too, in various areas of cultural criticism, a ‘pictorial’ or ‘iconic’ turn asserted the 
distinctive claims of the visual against its subjugation to the rule of linguistics.10 For many 
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theorists of the image, the concrete, embodied phenomenology of visual experience bore a 
strong ethical charge in relation to both the oppressive abstractions of the logos and the 
unanchored pluralities of the literary. It is hence not surprising that the two ‘turns’ – the 
ethical and the pictorial – come together in the efforts to establish more solid grounds for 
conviction in law in relation to the visual.  
As I have suggested, Richard K. Sherwin has played a leading role here. Besides his 
own publications, in 2005 Sherwin established the Visual Persuasion Project at New York 
Law School, which, in partnership with the pioneering centre for law and literature, the 
Cardozo Law School, held a major conference on ‘Visualizing the Law in the Digital Age’ in 
2011; in 2013, he and Anne Wagner, editor of the International Journal of the Semiotics of 
Law, published a substantial collection of essays on Law, Culture & Visual Studies.11 
Sherwin recognises the legitimate cognitive power of the visual celebrated by the pictorial 
turn, against what he attacks as ‘the Cartesian legacy … and its repudiation of embodied 
forms of knowing … its dismissal of emotional knowledge and the creative power of the 
imagination’ that has dominated in law hitherto.12 In this way, he maintains, ‘[t]he associative, 
affective logic of visual images helps us to escape the disembodied logic of instrumental 
reasoning’.13 This is the common language associated with the emancipatory claims of 
visual cognition. However, he maintains, recent technological developments have produced 
a too-ready credence in the gloss of the screen and a ‘loss of confidence in the reliability of 
visual representation’, leading to a ‘growing inability to distinguish fact from fiction, reality 
from fantasy, will from desire’.14 From this Sherwin diagnoses a ‘growing metaphysical 
anxiety’15 in relation to the expansion of visual media and of digitally-produced images that 
he associates with what he terms ‘the specter of the baroque’.16 Specifically, then, finders of 
fact in courts, lawyers, and viewers in general need to understand better the specific ways in 
which images operate if they are to avoid being induced into false beliefs based on the 
experience of visual ‘spectacles’ of ‘mere sensation’.17 Sherwin hence proposes a ‘new 
paradigm’18 for a ‘visual jurisprudence’, which he describes as ‘the confluence of the ethical 
and the aesthetic sublime’.19 What distinguishes the ‘visual sublime’ from the sensationalist 
spectacle of digital simulacra, he argues, is the experience of ‘something uncanny in the 
excess of meaning [in the image] … a sense of presence that cannot be easily explained’.20 
This uncanny feeling, he argues, is precisely what ‘brings justice to mind’.21 It is the 
association with justice of this sublime sense of presence in visual experience as the 
grounds for legitimate belief in the truth of images that I wish to bring into contact with what 
we might call the ‘iconic violence’ of the episodes referred to above. 
 I use the term ‘iconic’ here in two senses. First, the attacks are ‘iconic’ in the current 
banal use of the term in English – a use that reflects, on a popular level, the theoretical 
desire articulated by Sherwin for an experience of presence that offers a confident 
correlation between seeing and believing. In the face of the increasing plurality of cultural 
meanings, ‘icon’ and ‘iconic’ have come today to denote an unchallenged image of a shared 
and recognisable cultural value: the Empire State Building is an icon of New York; the 
Rolling Stones are an icon of the sixties; the Magna Carta is an ‘icon of liberty’.22 In the 
context of the instabilities of postmodern truths, we look for images that can ground 
collective beliefs, and call them ‘icons’. In that sense, the episodes that form the background 
to this article have themselves functioned culturally as ‘iconic’ images of the conflict between 
secularism and fundamentalism. Secondly, I am using ‘iconic’ in its historical sense – the 
sense in which theories of the icon have played an important role alongside the sublime in 
the pictorial turn at large and in thinking about law and the image, at least since Douzinas 
discussed classical eidola and Orthodox icons in the pioneering volume on Law and the 
Image he co-edited with Lynda Nead in 1999.23 We shall return to the icon and the sublime 
shortly. Finally, I invoke the term in the expression ‘iconic violence’ to remind us of the 
indissoluble link, as here, between the image and the destructive acts of what is described 
as iconoclasm. In its turn, iconoclasm has itself frequently been invoked as evidence of a 
contemporary crisis in visual culture, such as that identified by Sherwin.24 What, then, is the 
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significance of the language of the icon and the violence associated with it in the context of 
law, belief, and the visual today?  
The emancipation of the image 
Contemporary academic interest in the icon and its ethical promise was precipitated out of 
the critique of the traditional institution of art history that visual studies sought to supplant.25 
Besides a redirection from the word to the image, the pictorial turn involved an emancipatory 
expansion from painting and sculpture to the visual field as a whole. As Jás Elsner argues, 
the development of the modern study of the work of art had privileged certain kinds of 
images over others by subordinating visuality to a verbal narrative of the image’s genesis or 
its contextual meaning.26 For Elsner, ‘the triumph of text over image … which ultimately 
became the discipline of art history’ had its roots in the Reformation’s ‘attack on the real 
presence of Christian images’.27 In contrast, what interested visual theorists in the last years 
of the century was not primarily the meaning of images, but their effectiveness. As with the 
experience of Sherwin’s ‘visual sublime’, what has been at issue here is the superior 
capacity of images, relative to verbal discourse, to present, rather than represent, the truth – 
in short, their ability to command an ethical conviction of belief.  
In order to understand what, in his pioneering work of 1989, David Freedberg called 
The Power of Images, visual studies therefore needed to look aesthetically beyond the 
canon of art history and chronologically behind the Reformation.28 Freedberg drew on 
disciplines like the anthropology of religion, cognitive psychology and the phenomenology of 
perception to rescue popular responses to visual images from their repression under 
modernity, and to restore their value as transcultural forms of embodied cognition that we 
share today in our experience of art as much as in popular forms of visual experience. The 
emancipatory value of postmodern visual studies within broader postcolonial, feminist and 
queer critiques of phallogocentrism derived then from the particular value this approach gave 
to the sort of sensuous non-rational experience of the visual and its associative processes 
that was either marginalised by art history as ‘primitive’, ‘childish’, or ‘superstitious’, or 
associated with the intellectual inferiority and dangerous sensuality of unruly women, or, 
more respectfully but no less hierarchically, separated from aesthetics under the rubric of 
‘religious art’. In contrast to these repressive intellectualising tendencies, recognition of the 
essential characteristics of the visual, according to Freedberg, ‘makes us aware of our 
kinship with the unlettered, the coarse, the primitive, the undeveloped’ through aesthetic 
experiences rooted in the body and in sexual desire.29  
The pursuit of such experiences of presence brought into scholarly sight what in 
1994 Hans Belting famously termed the ‘era of images before art’.30 Here, it was argued, in 
pagan, classical and pre-Reformation religious images and cult objects, we find a rich record 
of the effectiveness of the visual. Of these, the Orthodox icon held a particular interest – 
ironically, in the context – because it offered the most extensive documentary record. The 
archive associated with the icon is important since, considered in relation to law, the 
emancipatory project at the heart of the pictorial turn cannot avoid addressing the Second 
Commandment, the foundational law constraining images, in the name of which the 
iconoclast commonly acts.  
In the literature on law and the visual, the Commandment has principally been read 
in the context of Immanuel Kant’s theory of the sublime and his statement that ‘there is no 
more sublime passage in the Jewish law than the commandment’ against images .31 In 
relation to our concerns here, there are a number of draw-backs to this reading of the 
prohibition. First, it keeps us within the context of the philosophical relationship between 
modern law and the sublime that underpin positions like Sherwin’s. Secondly, the Kantian 
context assumes the modern discourse of the ‘aesthetic’ which the pictorial turn we are 
looking at seeks to pre-empt. Lastly, the historical link with Kant and the sublime installs the 
modern association of ‘iconoclasm’ with the progressive secular politics of the French 
Revolution and the nineteenth-century innovations of avant-garde art that can be seen to 
inform the dominant narrative regarding Charlie Hebdo.32 While the revolutionary context is 
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not irrelevant to the issues under discussion, what Emmanuel Alloa has referred to as ‘The 
Strange Resurgence of a Kantian Motif in Contemporary Image Politics ’ fails, nevertheless, 
to give us sufficient critical purchase on a jurisprudence of the ‘visual sublime’.33 On the 
other hand, the focus on the icon rather than the sublime returns us to the earlier and more 
explicitly religious issues that, as I shall argue below, are otherwise at risk of being finessed 
in the modern context but are reaffirming themselves in the present day.  
The pertinence of the disputes over the icon to contemporary image theory is 
declared in the title of another essay by Alloa entitled ‘Visual Studies in Byzantium: A 
Pictorial Turn Avant La Lettre’, and by his claim that: ‘In many regards, the disputes of the 
8th and 9th century in Byzantium may represent something like a primary scene of 
contemporary visual studies.’34 The relevance of Byzantium to the pictorial turn lies in the 
fact that, according to Alloa, ‘[a]t both ends of the historical spectrum, a kind of image 
emerges that cannot be properly addressed by the notion of aesthetic judgment and not 
even by their referentiality; what they demand is a reflection on their visual efficacy.’35 And, 
out of that reflection emerged ‘a consistent and comprehensive image concept [with] a 
tremendous historical efficacy’.36 The triumph of the icon is, then, the founding moment of 
the ‘empire of the gaze and vision’ that Mondzain alluded to in our opening.37 And, as I shall 
argue in the last section, its mastery is exercised through the management of the relations 
between seeing and believing and believing and seeing. 
Returning to Byzantium 
The return to Byzantium starts by resetting the quarrel between word and image to the 
moment when, in contrast to the Reformation, the image triumphed over attempts to outlaw it 
in the name of the Old Testament logos. The legacy of Byzantium has three dimensions: 
aesthetic, theoretical, and, most importantly, polemic.  
 First, the iconoclastic debates consecrated an exemplary aesthetic in the form of the 
Orthodox icon. In contrast to the Hellenic sculptural body, Renaissance perspective oil 
painting, and the contemporary digital simulacrum, which are obliged to negotiate the 
accusation that their sheen and sensationalism can create a misleading illusion of presence, 
the icon achieves its uncanny effects through an idiom that is resolutely anti-naturalistic. It is 
characterised by a stylised graphic line and a symbolic and performative approach to colour 
and shading. Such artifices draw attention to the difference of the image from the prototype 
and ensure that it is proof against inducing a false sense of presence in the image itself:  
There is no pretense … to a summoning or evocation of the prototype, as is the case 
with the idol…This is what graphic inscription can do: it relates a visible periphery to 
an invisible and transfigured content.… Idolatry is averted because the gaze finds 
nothing to graze upon (to take up again Paul Klee’s word) in this delightfully empty 
object that respects the uncircumscribability of its prototype.38  
In sum, rather than seeking, like an idol, to circumscribe a divine presence or describe an 
illusory plenitude, the iconic line acts like a ‘threshold’ which, in its visibility, invokes and 
draws the worshipper towards the invisible truth beyond.39  
The aesthetic efficacy of the icon is not reducible to a question of form. The threshold 
effect results from the icon’s place as the heart of a multisensorial, performative experience 
in which the subject participates. As Bissera V. Pentcheva explains: 
While itself an absence (appearance), the Byzantine icon enacts divine presence 
(essence) in its making and in its interaction with the faithful. A person’s approach, 
movement, and breath disrupt the lights of the candles and oil lamps, making them 
flicker and oscillate on the surface of the icon. This glimmer of reflected rays is 
enhanced by the rising incense in the air, the sense of touch and taste, and the 
sound of prayer to animate the panel. The icon thus goes through a process of 
becoming, changing, and performing before the faithful.40 
As with a sculpture, the life of the image, the experience of presence, depends on the active 
engagement of a mobile viewer in the shared sacred space of its location.41 In the Orthodox 
icon, the subject is drawn towards the divinity through the animation of the image’s surface 
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that results from the concrete and specific relationship the viewer, the image and the 
environment in which the uncanny encounter between them takes place.  
Secondly, then, the efficacious aesthetic of the icon was supported in theoretical 
terms by a potent theological case. The iconophile’s answer to the Judaic prohibition relied 
decisively on the Pauline doctrine of the Incarnation. Central to what Mondzain calls ‘the 
iconic economy’, St Paul’s description of Christ as ‘the image of the invisible God, the 
firstborn of every creature’ interposed the figure of the Son between the prototype and the 
artificial image.42 The theory of Christ the Son as the natural image of God in the form of 
man redefined the possible pathways of imaginary resemblance away from the formal 
identity of the idol. It introduced a new mediation between the visible human world and the 
invisible truth that enabled the experience of presence without the blasphemous claim that 
the prototype inhered in the man-made image itself.43 As the icon is animated through the 
personal experience described by Pentecheva, it enacts incarnation as a living relation 
between the human, the man-made image, and the image of the Divine.  
 I do not intend to examine here the details of the frequently invoked aesthetics and 
theory of the icon but to return to the factor that I suggested earlier is restored by addressing 
the Biblical prohibition against images via the iconoclastic debates rather than the 
Enlightenment or postmodern philosophy of the sublime. Crucially, as James Elkins has 
observed, the contemporary recurrence of what he refers to as ‘the discourse around 
iconoclasm’, even more clearly than the language of ‘the postmodern sublime’, draws on 
fundamentally Christian concepts which are now being used metaphorically in a purportedly 
secular context.44 As Elkins puts it, we are dealing here with ideas that are ‘articulated as an 
echo, an analogy, or a metaphor of interests and concepts whose provenance is the history 
of Christian theology’.45 The danger, he warns, is that ‘Political questions [are] dissolved into 
questions of resurrection, incarnation, and the icon, and those questions precipitated back 
into politics’.46 But the religious dimensions of the discourses employed are not simply 
disarmed by being used metaphorically.  
 This is because, as we are seeing, the efficacy of the icon is a function not of its form 
but of the relationship between the image and what Pencheva refers to as ‘the faithful’ who 
experience it.47 As Mondzain puts it: ‘To say that the icon wanted to be a picture and not an 
idol or representation is to say that it institutes a gaze and not an object.’48 So, while it is 
undoubtedly helpful to describe the formal aesthetic characteristics of the object and the 
theological discourse that supports it, what is at issue in practice is the faithful gaze that, in 
its interaction with the visual body, gives life to it – that is to say, what the viewer believes 
about what they see. In his study of what he calls The Sacred Gaze, David Morgan argues 
that belief is not so much a matter of creedal content, but of visual practices that ‘invest[…] 
an image, a viewer, or an act of viewing with spiritual significance’.49 While constituting 
intimate experiences for individuals, these practices constitute ‘social act[s] of looking’.50 In 
terms reminiscent of Jacques Rancière, Morgan explains the gaze as a ‘configuration of 
ideas, attitudes, and customs’ which ‘carries particular assumptions about what is visible, the 
conditions under which the visible is visible, the rules governing visibility and the credibility of 
images, and what power an image may assert over those who see it’.51 In other words, a 
gaze is a matter of the beliefs and practices of a particular community regarding certain sorts 
of images, their efficacy and significance, the power attributed to them, and the norms that 
should govern them and their use and interpretation.52 This is true whether the community 
has a positive faith in the significance of the images or whether its faith is informed by a 
radical distrust of their power and legitimacy. In religious terms, the first translates itself as a 
veneration of the image; the latter as anathema. 
 In using metaphorically the language of a religious gaze or drawing on its theoretical 
model to describe the efficacy of the image as such in a secular context, the question 
therefore arises as to what sorts of belief take the place of those of religion. However one 
answers this question in ideological terms, the crucial point is that those beliefs are bound to 
be, in some sense, passionate – not least because, to cite Søren Kierkegaard, ‘faith is a 
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passion’.53 The attack on the World Trade Centre reminds Mondzain that ‘images have from 
the very beginning aroused strong passions’.54 She explains:  
With the incarnation, a new definition of the image entered into Greco-Roman culture 
and became the iconic paradigm of all shared visibilities. A common world was built 
that defined its culture as an articulation and management of the invisible and the 
visible. People had a passion for images. Naming the life of the Father’s image, that 
of Christ, with the word Passion, is in perfect harmony with the iconic. Christ’s 
Passion, that is, the Passion of the image, occurs in the image of the Passion.  
So Elkins declares himself ‘wary of the relatively sudden ascendance of iconoclasm, idolatry, 
iconophobia, and other concepts in art historical scholarship’ on the grounds that, as 
articulated by secular critics, ‘[a]n interest in iconoclasm is an interest in a passion stronger 
than one that we ourselves possess’ in relation to the images we are interested in.55 
According to the narrative that informs emancipatory approaches to law and the image, the 
historical weakening of visual passion was the result of the aestheticisation and 
domestication of embodied experience by the logocentric discourses from which visual 
studies are liberating the image; in contrast, visual theorists like those we have been 
discussing claim to have recovered the passionate dimension of the image in their accounts 
of its phenomenological efficacy. Nevertheless, Mondzain argues, it is faith in the incarnation 
that has been responsible for the pacification of the strong passions around the image, and, 
therefore, faith in the visual regime: ‘It is no longer the tragic speech of the Greeks but the 
image that calms the violence of all passions. Only the image can incarnate: this is the 
principal contribution of Christian thought.’56 While the economy of the icon persists in 
secular environments as the basis for convictions regarding the image, the mobilisation of 
the discourse around the icon bears a powerful metaphorical remainder, the shade of strong 
religious passions. In the context of the relationship between believing and seeing, it is this 
passionate remainder, I venture, that brings with it the problem of iconoclastic, and ‘iconic’, 
violence in relation to our beliefs about the truth of images. 
The iconoclast & the idolater 
The violence of iconoclasm takes us, then, to what I designated as the third contribution from 
viewing Byzantium as a ‘primary scene’ for visual studies and the most significant in relation 
to the discussion of believing, seeing, and the violence of the image: the polemical figure of 
the iconoclast. It is on the part of the iconoclast, the vigilante of the law of images, that the 
passions appeased by the Pauline economy of the icon are likely to erupt. The iconoclast is 
one of a triumvirate of militants of passion regarding images; his opponent, the iconophile or 
iconodule, is another, capable of being fierce in the image’s defence; and the third, the 
idolater, who worships the idol with sacrifices, is the necessary enemy of both and, as we 
shall see, the ultimate object and instrument of iconic violence. What is in truth most notable 
about these figures is their instability: how the one depends upon, and always risks being 
turned into, the other. It is this that makes the iconoclast an image of a polemical figure, a 
figure created by and for the purposes of polemic.  
The instability and polemical character of the iconoclast makes him, in various ways, 
monstrous.57 In the first place, like Frankenstein’s creature, he is a monster in the sense of 
being constructed out of fragments by his master. The original arguments of the Byzantine 
iconoclasts were themselves destroyed and, as a result, we only know them through the way 
they are selectively cited, for rebuttal, by the defenders of the icon. But the iconoclast is also 
monstrous in that, like Dr Jekyll, he displays two conflicting but inseparable natures in which 
the enlightened image associated with the French Revolution finds itself conjoined with the 
iconoclast’s reactionary past.58 On the one hand, the outrages committed in the name of 
fundamentalist Islam – the Taliban’s destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan (March 2001), 
the attack on the twin towers (September 2001), and the reaction to the Jyllands-Posten 
cartoons of the Prophet (2005) – are commonly cited as evidence of a revival of religious 
iconoclasm. And indeed, as if in response to an expectation, in March 2015, ISIS followed 
the sequence of beheading videos with another series of high-production videos featuring 
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the destruction of ancient Assyrian and Christian images and sites in Syria and Iraq. Yet, at 
the same time, in talking of a ‘new iconoclasm’, Sherwin associates the violence of religious 
fundamentalism with the enlightenment attitude of radical suspicion towards both religious 
belief and the image developed since the French Revolution by constructivist thinkers, from 
‘neo-Marxist social critics’ to Jean Baudrillard, postmodernists in general59 and what he 
symptomatically refers to in quasi-religious terms as the ‘excessive critical zeal’ of 
deconstruction.60 Sherwin is by no means alone in making such associations in his defence 
of the ethical value of the visual. For example, Bruno Latour associates ‘image destruction 
worship, the cult of iconoclasm as the ultimate intellectual virtue, the critical mind, the taste 
for nihilism’ in modern thought, with the actions of the Taliban, and concludes with the 
rhetorical question: ‘What has been most violent? The religious urge to destroy idols to bring 
humanity to the right cult of the true God or the anti-religious urge to destroy the sacred 
icons and bring humanity to its true senses?’61  
As the stitching-together of fragments has proceeded through time, the iconoclast 
has been revealed to be double in another sense. Iconoclasm has always been marked by 
Elsner’s observation that ‘the Byzantine strategy of iconoclasm … involves not simply the 
breaking but also the setting up of images: it is a process of creation as much as 
destruction’.62 Like contemporary engravings of French revolutionaries pulling down royal 
statues or the destruction of the monument to the Tsar in the opening of Sergei Eisenstein’s 
October (1928), the videos of the demolition of Nimrud and other sites by ISIS illustrate the 
fact that iconoclasts have always felt the need to make images of their destruction of 
images. For all his commitment to the destruction of images, then, the iconoclast also has a 
compulsion to create them. Ultimately, to cite the art historian Horst Bredekamp, ‘the 
iconoclasts are the real iconophiles. They believe in the social, the religious, the 
psychological power of images’.63  
Bruno Latour and others resolve these contradictory attitudes in a postmodern way 
by arguing that they are in fact constitutive of our relationship with the visual image, a 
condition that the organisers of the eponymous exhibition in 2002 famously termed 
‘iconoclash’.64 For Sherwin, it is precisely this indeterminacy within the phenomenology of 
visual experience that defines the crisis in law and the visual that he calls the ‘neo-
baroque’.65 But, I would argue, the discourse around iconoclasm can more profitably be 
viewed not in terms of a postmodern subjective ambivalence but rather as an agonic political 
struggle in which iconoclasm is not a simple prohibition of the image as such but in effect a 
position in relation to the iconophilia of others. Rather than ‘iconoclash’, this is a matter of 
what Morgan refers to as ‘iconomachy’, the term for a struggle over images used by the 
Byzantines themselves to describe the contemporary debates.66 Like Elsner, Morgan 
explains that ‘Iconoclasm … is not a purging of images tout à fait but a strategy of 
replacement’.67 In truth, the quarrel is not over the supremacy of word or image – after all, 
the Commandment prohibiting graven images is graven in stone. Rather it is, in the end, a 
battle between rival images or regimes of the gaze. The abiding result of the iconoclastic or 
iconomachic debates was the triumph of what Mondzain calls an ‘iconocracy’, the types of 
gaze enabled by the Christian economy of the image that continues to govern us and 
through which the West continues to seek to govern the world.68  
As we have seen, regarding the icon as a gaze rather than an image focuses 
attention on a community’s visual practices and assumptions. Viewing the debates as an 
iconomachy directs that focus to the political tensions between communities aligned with 
rival visual regimes. The discourse around iconoclasm operates then as an instrument in the 
struggle between them. Crucially, at points of crisis, as the Byzantine debates demonstrate, 
the relationship between iconoclast and idolater becomes reversible and tactical. The 
iconoclast accuses the iconodule of idolatry on the grounds that the latter mistakes the 
material image for the absent truth it represents. But the iconodule demonstrates that this is 
precisely to misunderstand the nature of the icon, just as an idolater does. As the iconophile 
Patriarch Nikephoros succinctly argued round 815: ‘If the image does not differ in some way, 
it is not an image.’69 The iconoclast is thus not just a shamefaced iconophile, as Bredekamp 
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claims, but in fact, at his most militant, he commits the idolater’s sin of misunderstanding the 
nature and status of the image: to use Mondzain’s words again, ‘It is because he is an 
idolater that he considers the icon through idolatrous eyes.’70 Applying Nikeforos’s logic to 
the Old Testament prohibition, it follows then that ‘it is because Jews are by nature idolaters 
that they were ordered not to make graven images’.71 The episode of the Golden Calf is 
proof. In short, what the prohibition does is to identify the sort of people who need to be 
under prohibition as idolaters. Within the rule of Western iconocracy, the reason for this is 
not far to find. Since what guards against idolatry is precisely the theory of the Incarnation, in 
attacking the icon, the iconoclast is denying the central doctrine of the Church. In sum, 
Mondzain concludes from Nikephoros’s catalogue of insults against the iconoclastic Emperor 
Constantine, the iconoclast is ‘Jewish at heart’.72 As the people identified with the prohibition 
against images, the Jews are doubly condemned as both iconoclasts and idolaters. 
Consequently, as she observes in her consideration of the graphic line of Nazi anti-Semitic 
caricatures, ‘Nothing resembles an iconoclast more than a Jew or an Arab to suppress.’73  
It is with the idolater, then, that the passion of iconic violence appears with full force. 
W.J.T. Mitchell suggests that ‘there is some kind of surplus in the very concept of idolatry, a 
moral panic that seems completely in excess of legitimate concerns about something called 
“graven images” and their possible abuse’’’.74 The surplus expresses itself most strongly in 
the association of idols with sacrifice: ‘The iconoclastic stereotype of the idolater, of course, 
is that he is already sacrificing his children and other innocent victims to his idol’.75 The 
answer to the question posed by Mondzain, ‘Can Images Kill?’, is yes, if the image in 
question is an idol. It follows then that something so deadly cannot be permitted to live: ‘the 
definition of the idol is nothing other than an image that must be killed’.76 After all, how else 
can one destroy its power to make one believe in its false presence than by demonstrating 
that the idol is merely material? Idols are destroyed in order to protect people from being 
sacrificed to them. The branding of images as idols is thus at the heart of what I referred to 
earlier as the management of the relations between seeing and believing and believing and 
seeing in a struggle over regimes of the visual. Images, as we have seen, are effective and 
unavoidable; power lies in the capacity to determine what sorts of images we are permitted 
to give credence to and the norms under which we should believe in their truth – but, 
critically, power equally requires the identification of rival kinds of image as idolatrous.  
There is, however, a further step in the logic of iconic violence, which has been 
hinted at continually above. Since, as we have seen, it is the gaze that makes the idol what it 
is, the anathema against it threatens the idolater him- or herself. The management of the 
economy of seeing and believing depends then not just on aesthetics, theology or law, but 
on the distribution of positions between the iconoclast and the idolater. ‘Whoever wishes to 
rule,’ argues Mondzain, ‘must, above all else, be a good manager of idolatry. What does this 
mean, if not that he must administer worship to his advantage by eluding the fate of all idols, 
which must, in turn, be sacrificeable, and indeed, always end up by being sacrificed’.77 In the 
context of Western iconocracy, identifying the iconoclast, ‘[t]he enemy of dominant 
visibilities’, as, at heart, a potential idolater, means that, in moments of crisis, he too may be 
‘expelled and sent to the camp of idolaters and idols destined for ritual sacrifice.’78 Although 
we are rarely reminded of the fact, the sacrifice of the idolater in the name of the iconoclast 
is, after all, already part of the foundational story of the law of images: following the 
destruction of the Golden Calf, Moses ordered the sons of Levi to massacre 3,000 of their 
compatriots. ‘This,’ comments Jan Assmann, ‘is what it means to be a zealot.’79  
Icons of violence 
Thus we come to the two images to which I alluded in the opening, and again to ‘the death of 
the image in the image of death’.80 Neither can be illustrated here, for different reasons 
relating to what one believes should or should not be displayed. In each, the head of an 
enemy is separated from its body, in one case literally. The chiasmus arises from the fact 
that both are iconoclastic gestures that use dominant iconocratic practices to produce 
images of the destruction of the human image, each of which is justified by being configured 
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as representative of a violent idolatrous prototype. While this analysis is unlikely to be 
controversial in the case of the execution video, I shall argue that it is also true, albeit in 
significantly different ways, of the cartoon. Both images, I want to suggest, are expressions 
of zeal. 
Although its perceived content transgresses the accepted limits of the iconocratic 
image, the video made by ISIS depicting the sacrifice of a prisoner draws on a dominant 
mode of the visual industries’ discourse of evidence, using the techniques of Western 
documentary video-making to shocking effect.81 The video uses intertexts, split screen 
images, and the montage of a newsreel insert of President Obama’s promise of air attacks 
combined with ‘humanitarian’ action, followed by military film from an aircraft destroying a 
distant target. These recorded images are followed by more artisanal footage of direct 
addresses to camera from the victim and the executioner, culminating in the act of 
execution.82 ISIS appears to be deliberately exploiting the enemy’s faith in its own visual 
aesthetics to ensure the maximum efficacy of its images. Notably, however, the use of 
documentary techniques did not prove sufficient in themselves to produce the conviction of 
belief in what we see. Pace Sherwin’s concern about their gullibility, viewers accustomed to 
graphic images of decapitation from numerous horror films and popular television series like 
Spartacus or War of Thrones, have learnt to be sceptical regarding the evidence of 
cinematic verisimilitude.83 It was not only conspiracy websites that from the start examined 
the videos frame by frame like media students, to demonstrate that they had been ‘faked’. 
Faced with the first of the beheadings, respectable newspapers also cited the opinion of ‘an 
international forensic science company’ suggesting that what they referred to as ‘camera 
trickery and slick post-production techniques’ may have been used to ‘stage’ the execution.84  
Yet, past these reactions, the video certainly achieved its desired effect, which has 
been reinforced by a number of repetitions of the horrific formula. Nonetheless, the proof of 
the dependence of the effectiveness of these images on the regime to which they belong is 
that we did not, in fact, need to see the execution itself in order to believe in its evidence and 
experience its effects. The Western press decided not to show the whole video; but, even if it 
had, audiences would have found that, as the executioner begins to making sawing motions 
with his knife at the victim’s throat, in a shot that, although frontal, is too distant for the 
viewer to observe the action in detail, the video itself fades to black, followed by a shot 
panning the length of a dead body before coming to a halt on the victim’s bloody head posed 
on his back. This was surely not a result of squeamishness on behalf of ISIS, since the same 
decorum is not found in contemporary recordings of the execution of Arab prisoners. Rather 
it reflects a faithfulness to the economy of the image they chose to employ. This video stops, 
iconically as it were, at the threshold of the moment when death is made present and after 
which it has occurred, while drawing the viewer ineluctably towards the unrepresentable 
truth. In the end, it was the performative context that led spectators to believe fully in the 
reality of what they were shown, that what they were viewing was not the iconoclastic 
destruction of a filmic image but the sacrifice of a living being. Conviction of the authenticity 
of what was broadcast by the media was backed by the beliefs that were disseminated about 
the relationship between ISIS, images and the violence of their ‘justice’ against infidels.  
The video uses other elements drawn from the Western visual regime to configure 
the agonic relationship between two communities with different beliefs. The introductory 
newsreel and military inserts appear designed to justify the action that follows by 
establishing the victim not as an individual defined by a personal history but as a 
representative image of ‘America’, like that of the elected President himself. The sacrificial 
slaughter that follows positions those whose gaze it attacks as idolaters: their idol is their 
own likeness as the embodiment of the sanctity of all human life. It is this that makes the 
images so much more outrageous, that one sees in it more than the loss of one life but the 
expression of a culture that defies all human values – a ‘death cult’, in the words of the 
British Prime Minister.85 The move is complemented by images of the other side of 
America’s allegedly idolatrous practices, here figured by the air attack that follows the 
President’s announcement: its indiscriminate destruction of unseen Muslims in the name of 
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universal ‘humanitarianism’. In sum, the Americans are portrayed as idolaters who sacrifice 
Muslim subjects to their worship of themselves as the real image of humanity.  
 The second image of iconic violence is of an apparently quite different type. Kurt 
Westergaard’s cartoon of the Prophet was published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-
Posten as part of a dozen controversial drawings edited by the Danish journalist Flemming 
Rose.86 The violence which, I argue, this image also articulates is, of course, 
incommensurable with the murders documented in the videos; but that does not mean that 
there is not iconoclastic passion and the associated accusation of idolatry implied here which 
are conducive to a climate of physical violence against those figured by the image. While the 
ISIS video uses the aesthetic of those whom it attacks to turn their gaze against themselves, 
by defying Islam’s iconoclastic ban on images of the Prophet, the cartoon aggressively 
stages a confrontation between quite distinct visual regimes. 
Although also firmly within the reigning Western economy of the image, in style the 
cartoon evidently could not be more different from the video. In contrast to the latter’s 
multimodal verisimilitude, here we have a simple line-drawing, depicting in outline a fierce-
eyed, bearded head wearing a turban, the curve of which morphs into a cartoon bomb. 
Besides the context of the other images and the surrounding text in the newspaper in which 
it appeared, the design is identifiable as the Prophet by the Arabic script that emblazons the 
turban and by the stylised graphic line describing its features – the outline and the eyes, 
nose, and facial hair (note the absence of a mouth). The image is almost entirely 
monochromatic. Other than the symbolic use of a flat, flesh-coloured wash on the face and 
the yellow illumination of the calligraphy, it is dominated by the black of the turban and 
beard. The simple curved line that describes the circumference of the bomb draws the 
viewer’s eye to the upper right corner where the line turns into a lit fuse, culminating in the 
only other use of colour as the line-fuse cartoonishly burns, soon to explode.  
What do we make of this? Rather than a naturalistic or photographic portrait, the 
drawing of the Prophet iconically presents an immediately recognised caricature of someone 
of whom no known likeness exists. While we know what we believe about documentary 
footage, including nowadays a measure of scepticism, we also understand the gaze of the 
caricaturist; we have learnt to regard such images as drawing us towards satirical truths.  
E. H. Gombrich and Ernst Kris’s classic study of the caricature places the origin of 
the modern form in the ‘portrait-caricatures’ of the seventeenth century that were adapted to 
political purposes in 1780-1820 by the likes of James Gillray and subsequently by the 
cartoons of King Louise-Phillipe by Charles Philipon and Honoré Daumier, both of whom 
were prosecuted in 1831-2 for the crime of lèse majesté.87 The crime here, as Oliver Watts 
explains, was to challenge ‘the sacred presence of the king in the image’ of the nation.88 
Caricatures are hence a sort of icon of Enlightenment iconoclasm, using stylised graphic 
strokes to break the illusory presence of the image of power. Performing a ‘comic distortion 
of an individual’, caricatures convey a moral, or political, critique of what is alluded to through 
their graphic contours.89 In other words, our modern gaze views the caricature as a critical 
discourse that uses an exaggerated, unnaturalistic but recognisable line as a threshold 
between the image and the absent prototype, bridged and animated by a belief in the 
potential of satire to speak the truth of what is concealed in official public likenesses.  
While the caricature is modern, satire of course is not. Before its classical origins, 
Assman tells us that it is a common mode of ‘denunciation’ used in the Bible to attack 
idolatry. It did this by turning a ‘wilfully uncomprehending gaze’, similar to that used in the 
ancient Egyptian ‘satire of trades’, on ‘the rites of foreign religions’.90 In that sense, this 
image of precisely what Islam prohibits as an image also depicts a mortal confrontation 
between communities, mediated through accusations of idolatry. By declaring its iconoclastic 
purpose to ridicule the veneration of the Prophet, Westergaard’s wilfully uncomprehending 
gaze claims to reveal a hidden truth about Islam. That truth links the prohibition against the 
representation of the likeness of the Prophet with the violence of the terrorist.  
The same drawing that is designed to express a horror at the ‘cult’ of Islamic 
terrorism is equally capable of provoking outrage among those who believe – for a variety of 
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reasons, not only those attributed to Islamic fundamentalists – that images like this should 
not be displayed. For example, an argument based on human rights and a critique of hate 
speech might observe that the cartoon of the Prophet risks conflating the caricature of an 
individual with a racial or ethnic prototype – the inverse, if one likes, of the implied idolatry of 
the ‘humanitarian’ in the ISIS video. Indeed, one might feel, in its resemblance to the 
graphics of Nazi anti-Semitic images, the threshold-effect of the caricature brings into 
presence an entire community as the object of its vision of image-destruction. Further, given 
that the justification for iconoclasm is that the image is regarded as an idol, the implication 
that all those who believe in the Prophet are themselves idolaters becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy whose truth is evidenced by their reaction to the cartoon itself. The image of the 
Prophet-bomb is hence an ‘image of death in the death of the image’ in that it invokes not 
only the ‘blowing up’ of innocent victims of Islamic terror, but of the Prophet himself and 
those who believe in him, caught by the image in a double-bind of idolatry. In that sense, the 
most violent aspect of the caricature is its foreclosure of any view of the image that 
challenges the legitimacy of this sort of iconoclastic icon. 
In the end, what the discourse around iconoclasm shows is that what is at issue isn’t 
so much, as Sherwin seems to argue, the genre, technology or modality of images – be they 
photographic or diagrammatic, analogue or digital, sensationalist or sublime; nor the 
question whether there are types of visual experience that may be, by their nature, reliable, 
as opposed to others that tend to seduce and mislead. Our conviction by visual experience 
relies in the first place on the collective assumptions and practices we share that render the 
economy of the image by which we are convinced invisible to us. At moments of crisis, what, 
borrowing its religious overtones in a secular context, I have referred to as ‘zeal’ can turn this 
‘common sense’ into a criterion of legitimacy for others as well as ourselves . ‘Zeal’ describes 
a certain quality of commitment or passion towards one’s beliefs; but from a philological 
point of view, it can also signify a fierce jealousy of, or rivalry with, another’s. What is in fact 
at issue in laws that seek to manage the passions connecting seeing and believing and the 
violence they can mandate is, then, the legitimisation of a regime of visuality through the 
attitudes people have to others who share different visual practices and beliefs. That is to 
say, ultimately, then, between the way people regard each other in the way they regard 
images. Miguel Tamen suggests, in iconoclasm, the hostility comes first, the theory follows.91  
I have argued here that the practice and discourses on behalf of and against 
iconoclasm bring with them the implication of a set of passions that, historically speaking, 
are religious in origin: either to execrate and destroy, or to venerate, the image. The 
caricature of the Prophet may then make us ask what, if anything, takes the place of the 
passions of veneration and execration towards the image for those who inhabit a culture in 
which seeing claims to be dissociated from religious belief? And what, then, are the 
appropriate ways of envisaging a critical position towards the point-of-view, the ‘sacred 
gazes’, if you will, of others whose beliefs about seeing we do not share. At the very least, 
one might conclude, it should avoid the insinuations of iconoclasm and idolatry through 
which political differences masquerade as visual legitimacies and transgressions. The 
question to ask about an image, then, is not whether it is true but for whom and under what 
conditions might it be believed?  
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